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This paper examines the impact of organized crime on the regional distribution of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows into Italy. The incidence of crime has been calculated 
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regressions. Furthermore, such a correlation between crime and FDI seems to be valid only 
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also suggests that certain levels of crime can be perceived by foreign investors as a signal of 
an unfavorable business climate. 
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The geographical distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows into Italy shows some striking regional differences. The eight less 
developed regions of the South — the so-called Mezzogiorno  area — 
receive, in fact, a very modest share of FDI. For instance, in the period 
2005-2007, these regions received less than one per cent of total inflows; in 
Campania, the Southern region with the best performance, FDI amounted to 
only 0.2  per cent of all those inflows into Italy. 
The low degree of attractiveness of the Southern regions is also 
illustrated by the “geography” of multinational firms located in Italy. In 
2006, the firms with foreign participation in these regions amounted to less 
than 5 per cent of the Italian total. For the sake of comparison, in Lombardy 
alone there were ten times as many firms with foreign capital as in the entire 
area of the Mezzogiorno.  
Despite this performance, in Southern Italy there are several factors 
which, at least potentially, could attract foreign investors. First of all, this 
area represents a major share of the domestic market: its population is of 
almost  21 million people, that is 35 per cent of the national total. Secondly, 
in the Mezzogiorno there is a considerable skilled workforce, and the labor 
cost is lower than the Italian average. Furthermore, in many Southern 
regions there are extensive uncongested industrial areas able to offer 
business location benefits (IPI, 2005). Finally, firms that invest in the South 
— especially in the less developed regions — may benefit from a series of 
financial incentives provided by European and national programs.  
However, against such potential benefits, Southern Italy has several 
comparative disadvantages that negatively affect its attractiveness (Basile, 
2001). One of these disadvantages is the historically rooted presence of 
several criminal organizations of the Mafia type: Camorra, Cosa nostra, 
‘Ndrangheta,  Sacra Corona Unita
1. The incidence of these ‘Mafia’ is 
particularly high in certain regions: notably Calabria, Campania, Sicily and, 
to a lesser extent, Apulia. From an economic point of view, crime may be 
considered an additional risk (or cost) for business activities (Krkoska and 
Robeck, 2006). Crime, especially if of the Mafia type, tends to damage 
business in various ways: racketeering; retailing market limitations; forcing 
firms to take on suppliers of raw materials or being pressurized to employ 
                                                 
 
1 The term Mafia comprises different criminal organisation: camorra is the name of Campania based 
organised crime, Cosa nostra those of Sicilian, ‘Ndrangheta those of Calabria and Sacra Corona 
Unita of the Apulia.   
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workers; creating local monopolies and distortions to the markets 
(Gambetta, 1996; Centorrino et al. 1993; Arlacchi, 2007). All in all, the 
presence of crime can be considered as one aspect of a somewhat 
unfavorable business climate: consequently, it represents a disincentive for 
foreign and national investments. 
Besides having been pointed out many times by scholars, economic 
operators and politicians, the deterrent effect of crime on foreign investment 
has been amply confirmed in surveys conducted among national and foreign 
investors (Marini and Turato, 2002; GPF-ISPO, 2005). In Italy, the 
detrimental effects of crime and regional economic development have been 
examined by sociologists and economists (Peri, 2004; La Spina, 2008; 
Centorrino and Ofria, 2008; Daniele, 2009). Quite surprisingly, yet, little 
attention has been paid to estimating the effects on foreign investment. By 
using data for different kinds of crime, this study analyses the geography of 
organized crime in Italy and estimates its impact on the distribution of FDI 
inflows at the provincial level. The results show how the correlation 
between organized crime and FDI inflows into the Italian provinces is both 
negative and significant. This correlation results as being robust even when 
an indicator for financial incentives for investments is included in the 
regressions.  
In general, the conclusions reached in this study suggest that the 
quality of the “local business environment” influences the location of 
foreign companies and also diminishes the effectiveness of financial 
incentives for investments. Although our analysis shows that organized 
crime is, in itself, a disincentive for investment, it suggests that certain 
levels of crime can be perceived by foreign investors as a signal of an 
unfavorable socio-institutional system.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the 
regional distributions of FDI inflows in Italy and its determinants. Section 3 
offers a brief review of the economic effects of crime. Section 4 describes 
the data and the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, section 5 contains 
some conclusive remarks. 
2. The location of FDI in Italy 
2.1. Regional distribution 
In all countries, the locations of multinational firms show regional 
asymmetries. In Spain, for example, Madrid and Cataluña are the main 
destinations of FDI; in France, Greece and in the United Kingdom it is also  
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possible to find clear regional differences
2. In Italy the degree of spatial 
concentration of FDI is very high. As shown by Table 1, that reports the 
share of FDI inflows in the twenty Italian regions, Lombardy has received 
the largest amount (69%), followed by Piedmont (13%) and Lazio (7%). 
The shares of the other regions are far less. Overall, the Centre-North area 
received almost all the FDI inflows in the country; consequently, the share 
of the Southern regions is residual, amounting to less than 1 per cent of the 
national total. Equally high regional differences are encountered if we 
consider the ratio of FDI to GDP. In the period 2000-2006, net FDI inflows 
on average represented about 1.6 per cent of GDP in the Northwest, 0.6 in 
the central regions and just 0.1 per cent in those of the South.  
 
Table 1. FDI inflows in the Italian regions in percentage of Italy, 2005 and 2006 
Regions 2005  2006  Regions  2005  2006 
Abruzzo   0.1  0.1  Piedmont  15.5  11.4 
Apulia  0.1 0.2  Molise  0.1 0.0 
Basilicata  0.2 0.2  Sardinia  0.0 0.1 
Calabria  0.0 0.0  Sicily  0.0 0.0 
Campania  0.3 0.2  Tuscany  3.6 1.9 
Emilia Romagna  2.5  3.7  Trentino A. A.  0.2  0.5 
Friuli  0.1 0.1  Umbria  1.0 0.8 
Lazio  6.2 7.8  Valle  d’Aosta  0.0 0.0 
Liguria  0.5 0.7  Veneto  4.3 4.2 
Lombardy 69.7  68.2  Centre-North  99.2  99.3 
Marche  0.1 0.0  Mezzogiorno  0.8 0.7 
Data refer to FDI gross flows IDE and do not include trade credits and transactions in the banking sector. Source: 
Italian Exchange Office (UIC). 
 
At the provincial level, the degree of concentration of FDI is even 
greater. Table 2 reports the first and last ten provinces in the ranking on the 
basis of FDI inflows in the period 2004-2006. Notably, the province of 
Milan alone absorbs over 66 per cent of total flows, while the top three are 
provinces with large urban areas. Moreover, the data show that nine of the 
last ten places are held by provinces in the Mezzogiorno area.  
 
Table 2. Top and bottom provinces ranked for FDI inflows in the years 2004-06, in % 
of Italy 
Rank Provinces  FDI  Rank Provinces  FDI 
                                                 
 
2 For the French case, cfr. Mayer (2004); for Spain, Hermosilla and Ortega (2003); for Britain, 
Devereux et al. (2007); for Greece, Kokkinou and Psycharis (2004).   
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1 Milan  66.46  94  Foggia  0.001 
2 Turin  9.25  95  Ragusa  0.001 
3 Rome  6.33  96  Reggio  Cal.  0.001 
4 Florence  3.06  97  Gorizia  0.001 
5 Verona  2.86  98  Agrigento  0.001 
6 Bologna  2.63  99  Catanzaro  0.001 
7 Cuneo  2.03  100  Caltanissetta  0.001 
8 Terni  0.99  101  Enna  0.000 
9 Alessandria  0.75  102  Vibo  Valentia  0.000 
10 Vicenza  0.56  103  Oristano  0.000 
Source: Calculations on Italian Exchange Office data.  
 
The presence of foreign firms in the Italian regions may be examined 
more in depth through data on the number of firms with foreign 
participation located in Italy (Tab. 3). Overall, among the over 7,100 firms 
with foreign participation operating in Italy in 2006, only 318 had their 
headquarters in Southern regions, creating only 3 per cent of the total 
number of jobs generated by foreign enterprises located in Italy. The case of 
Lombardy is striking: the region hosts half of the all Italian firms with 
foreign capital, and generates over 45 per cent of employment and sales of 
all such firms. As observed for FDI inflows, Lombardy is followed by 
Piedmont, Lazio and Emilia.   
 
Table 3. Number, employees and sales of foreign-participated Italian firms 
Years Firms  Employees  Sales 
  Centre-North South Centre-North South Centre-North South 
2001  6,359  329  850,698 62,136 315,290 18,611 
2004  6,739  347  867,294 60,071 346,353 18,031 
2006  6,776  318  811,144 46,895 378,597 15,481 
For the region where the firm is headquartered; data refer to January 1st in each of the years considered. Source: 
Elaborations of the Reprint data base, ICE - Milan Polytechnic. 
 
Finally, Fig. 1 reports the number of greenfield investments in the 
two Italian macro-regions and in other European countries. Firstly, it easy to 
see how the attractiveness of Italy is relatively low in comparison with other 
European countries with analogous levels of development (Committeri, 
2004). Secondly, figures show how the number of investment projects 
located in the South of Italy is very low, less than 10 per cent of the total. In 
addition, these investments concern, almost entirely, small-scale projects in 





















Note: Number of greenfield investments in the period 2000-2007. Source: OCO Monitor 
 
In synthesis, these data confirm how the geography of foreign 
investment in Italy is characterized by profound regional differences and 
how the South is, overall, completely marginal with respect to the dynamics 
of the passive internationalization of Italian firms.  
2. 2. Determinants of FDI inflows 
The location choices of multinational firms are influenced by several 
factors. At the national level, empirical studies show how a large share of 
FDI involves countries with large market dimensions and geographical 
proximity; other factors, such as common borders and a common language, 
tend also to influence the investment flows (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 
2004). Studies referring to the European Union show how the location of 
foreign firms is guided mainly by the firms’ specific characteristics and, to a 
lesser extent, by observable national or regional factors. Broadly speaking, 
the determinants of FDI location can be classified in four groups: expected 
market demand, factor costs, the presence of agglomeration economies, and 
public policies capable of influencing the firms’ activities (Devereux and 
Griffith, 2003; Crozet et al., 2004; Pelegrin and Bolancé, 2008).   
At the sub-national level, the location decisions of foreign investors 
are influenced by several factors and regional-specific factors (Artige and 
Nicolini, 2005; Alegría, 2006; Devereux et al., 2007; Basile et al., 2009). 
For example, a study on the location factors conducted by the European 
Commission (2006), on a sample of approximately 100,000 foreign 
companies, showed how, in the European Union context, FDI tend to locate 
in regions with:  
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  a large presence of previous foreign investors; 
  good infrastructure and accessibility; 
  a highly educated workforce and a high level of R&D expenditure; 
    the presence of agglomeration economies, determined by a large 
presence of competitors, clients and suppliers within the firm’s 
industry. 
Studies on Italy suggest how the relative level of development, the 
labor costs, the efficiency of the bureaucratic system and the quality of 
human capital significantly influence the regional location choices of 
foreign firms. The low competitiveness of the South is, in large part, 
explained by these variables, even if some factors (such as red tape) are 
common throughout Italy (Barba-Navaretti et al. 2009).  
Foreign investments can represent a propulsive factor for regional 
development. They contribute towards raising employment and income 
levels, to transfer technologies and generate spill-over that produces positive 
effects on sector productivity (Konings, 2004; Devereux et al., 2007). For 
these reasons, many countries — including Italy — offer incentives or 
subsidies to foreign companies that invest in their less developed areas.  
Empirical studies offer mixed evidence on the effects of financial 
incentives in attracting FDI. For example, a study of the Irish case shows 
that regional policies, despite promoting foreign business location in 
disadvantaged areas of the country, have acted almost “selectively” on firms 
with a low technological content (Barrios et al. 2003). In Italy, as in France, 
Spain, or the UK, research shows that financial incentives for investments 
(e.g. grants or easy-term loans), tax relief or EU structural policies do not 
have a significant effect in attracting foreign investment in underdeveloped 
regions (Mayer, 2004; Devereux et al. 2007). On the contrary, a study 
conducted by Basile et al. (2009), using data for 5,509 foreign subsidiaries 
established in 50 European regions, found that Structural and Cohesion 
funds allocated by the EU to laggard regions have contributed to attracting 
multinationals.   
A recent strand of literature has been devoted to the investigation of 
how FDI is influenced by cross-country differences in the political, 
institutional and legal systems. There are several reasons for which the 
quality of institutions may be important for FDI. The first reason is that — 
according to the studies on long-term growth determinants — efficient 
institutions improve productivity prospects and, consequently, this attracts 
investors. The second reason is that a poor institutional environment can 
bring about additional costs for firms: this can be the case with crime and  
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corruption (Broadman and Recanatini, 2000; Wei, 2000). A further reason is 
that – due to high sunk costs – FDI is highly exposed to uncertainty, 
including that stemming from poor government efficiency, graft, or the 
weak enforcement of property rights and of the legal system (Bénassy-
Quéré et al., 2005).  
Studies generally confirm that a “good” institutional environment is 
an important determinant of FDI inflows. This institutional environment 
includes, for instance, the ease of creating companies, government 
effectiveness, the security of property rights, the efficiency of the judicial 
systems and a lack of corruption (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2001). The World Bank (2001) has emphasized how the 
attraction of investments is greater in areas where the public institutions are 
perceived as being more credible by the community of investors. This 
means that they are considered capable, and that they intend to put into 
practice the policies undertaken, as well as having administrative and 
judicial approaches consistent and foreseeable, together with acceptable 
levels of crime and corruption. Some case-studies, such as those for Central 
American countries (United Nations, 2007) and Russia (Broadman and 
Recanatini, 2001), further suggest that violence and crime deter foreign 
investors.   
From the international literature it emerges quite clearly, therefore, 
how the quality of the institutional system and the business climate 
influence decisions regarding the location of foreign firms. Such an effect 
could also be relevant at a regional level when, as in the Italian case, notable 
differences exist in the quality of the local socio-institutional environments.  
3. Crime and the economy 
3.1 The economic effects of crime 
Crime imposes significant costs on society. There are those relative 
to protection and prevention, those sustained by the victims as a 
consequence of crime and those for the response to crime. They correspond 
to monetary payments that fall directly both on private individuals and on 
the community. Estimating these costs is a complex but useful operation, 
both for designing strategies to fight crime and for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the measures applied (Brand and Price, 2000; Czabanski, 
2008). 
Not always, however, does the social cost of crime correspond to a 
monetary disbursement. Since a high incidence of crime is detrimental to  
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legal economic activities, it implies a loss in employment and investments, 
affecting economic development negatively (Peri, 2004; Bonaccorsi di Patti, 
2009). For instance, by analyzing the relationship between crime and the 
enterprise sector in a range of countries with different levels of 
development, Krkoska and Robeck (2006) have indicated how organized 
crime has a deterrent effect on business, particularly enterprises entry and 
expansion, while the perception of crime results as a serious obstacle to the 
willingness of foreign investors to enter a country.  
In the Italian case, the effects of organized crime on the economic 
outcomes have been widely examined from the sociological and historical 
points of view, but far less from the economic viewpoint. Often, in fact, 
economists have focused more on the determinants of criminality than on 
the effects that it produces on the economy (Marselli and Vannini, 2003; 
Buonanno, 2006).  
Some recent studies have, however, shown how organized crime can 
have relevant effects on both economic growth and on the quality of the 
local institutional systems. For instance, Centorrino and Ofria (2008) have 
proved the negative effect of crime on the rate of growth of labors 
productivity, in particular in the Southern regions. Peri (2004), examining 
the economic performance of the Italian provinces over the period 1951-
1993, found a strong and negative correlation between the incidence of 
organized crime (measured as a high murder rate) and economic 
development. Recently, Bonaccorsi di Patti (2009) has analyzed the 
relationship between the terms of bank loans and crime rates, using a survey 
of over 300,000 bank-firm relationships. The results are striking: where the 
crime rate is higher, borrowers pay higher interest rates and pledge more 
collateral than in low-crime areas; furthermore, the access to bank credit is 
negatively influenced by crime. Since less credit implies lower investment, 
the economic growth of those Italian regions lagging behind is negatively 
affected. 
There are many ways in which crime conditions the legal economy. 
One of the most evident is the racket of extortion. The activity of extortion 
is typical of the criminal organizations of the Mafia type. It has two main 
aims: to ensure a sufficiently steady income, generally directed at financing 
other illegal activities, and to permit the criminal clans to exercise a 
widespread control over the territory.  In a certain sense extortion — 
“pizzo” in the slang of the mafiosi — is a crime typical of the Italian Mafia, 
because it is connected with a traditional activity of Mafia families: the 
selling of protection in a certain territory (Catanzaro, 1991). As pointed out 
by Gambetta (1996), ‘providing’ protection to legitimate industries has 
been, for a long time, the distinctive activity of the Sicilian Mafia.   
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Criminal organizations of the Mafia type also practice other forms of 
control over the local economy. Often, in fact, the clans force  legal firms to 
purchase raw materials from specific suppliers, to hire personnel that are 
linked to the same organizations or impose limitations to sales markets. The 
activity of extortion and the control over a part of the legal economy has 
been well documented in judiciary inquests and the subject of much 
research (La Spina and Lo Forte, 2007; CPI, 2008)
3. Numerous inquests 
testify how organized crime manages to condition the activities even of 
large companies involved in some programs of public works regarding the 
Southern regions (Confesercenti, 2007). 
In general, crime increases the risks for (and the costs of) 
investment, and therefore has a depressive effect on the economy. In 
particular, crime discourages investment by raising the economic risks to 
companies, deriving from possible attacks, the destruction of property and 
intimidation. Insurance against such risks implies financial expense, both in 
the case of acquiescence (the payment of bribes, being obliged to purchase 
raw materials from firms with criminal connections), and in the case of self-
defense (private police and security measures). 
A further depressive effect on the economy derives from the 
operations of the same “entrepreneurs of crime”. Through the use of 
violence or corruption to impose monopolies, the “criminal ‘firms” 
condition the functioning of the markets and local institutions, distorting the 
allocation of resources and capturing a part of public expenditure, including 
European funds for regional development (CPI, 2008).The result is that the 
functional capabilities of local market and institutional systems are 
compromised negatively affecting the development of the economy 
(Centorrino and Signorino, 1993; Zamagni, 1993). 
The presence of organized crime imposes notable economic (and 
social) costs in many areas of Southern Italy. One such cost, rarely 
considered, derives from the fact that the criminal presence tends to 
discourage both domestic and foreign investment, as some surveys confirm.  
One such survey, conducted by Marini and Turato (2002) on a panel 
of businessmen from the North-East of Italy involved in the process of 
internationalization, showed how almost all of those interviewed (93%) 
believed the presence of criminality to be the principal block to investment 
                                                 
 
3 According to the data contained within the Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commission of 
Inquest on criminal organisations (2008), in the area of the judicial district of Catanzaro, in Calabria, 
companies which resist the pressures from organised crime are, practically, non-existent; furthermore, 
the report carries the denouncements made by the representative of a large Tour Operator, Parmatour, 
who declared that tourist resort villages in Calabria were systematically subject to extortion.  
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in the Mezzogiorno  area. Another survey, conducted in 11 Countries on 
behalf of the Italian Ministry of the Economy, has indicated how, in the 
perception of businessmen, the Mezzogiorno appears an area lacking 
conditions of security (Gpf-Ispo, 2005)
4. The deterrent effect of crime for 
foreign investors with regard to the South of Italy  has been highlighted by 
economists for years. For example, Sylos Labini (1985), has observed how 
the presence of organized crime in the South forces companies to transfer 
elsewhere, discouraging those who intend to invest. Olson (1984) has 
underlined how, as a result of organized crime, Southern Italy has 
accumulated, over a period of time, a vast range of extra-governmental 
institutions that have eroded the economic space, increasing the risks for 
investment. For this reason — Olson argues — whoever intends to start a 
new business in such an environment, will confront a series of risks that 
could be avoided by starting the business in a less “risky” area.  
Although wealthy with implications, the problems raised by Paolo 
Sylos-Labini and Mancur Olson over twenty years ago have received little 
attention in economic literature. Only recently, in fact, has some research on 
the determinants of FDI considered the crime rate among the explicative 
variables included in the regressions, showing how, in Italy, high crime 
rates tend to be negatively correlated with the regional attractiveness for 
foreign investors (Basile, 2001; Daniele, 2005). 
In respect to these studies our analysis differs both for method and 
for content. It uses, in fact, panel data for a disaggregated level of territory 
(103 provinces) and different estimate procedures. Furthermore, it considers 
different measures of criminality, paying particular attention to that of the 
Mafia type. As far as we are aware, our research constitutes the first attempt 
explicitly aimed at estimating the impact of crime on FDI in the case of 
Italy. 
3.2. Measuring organized crime 
The Italian Penal Code defines organized crime, making a clear 
distinction between “criminal association” (art. 416) and “Mafia type 
                                                 
 
4 The issue of security and its importance for internal and external investments in the Mezzogiorno 
has long been part of the political and economic debate in Italy. Recently, a series of events has made 
this issue one of the most urgent for development in southern Italy. The Federation of Anti-racket and 
Anti-usury Associations (FAI) has proposed the establishment of a “security tutor” for foreign firms 
interested in investing in the Mezzogiorno (FAI, Antiracket tutoring, Experimental three-year project, 
Naples, 12 December 2007). One of the reasons behind the above project was the declaration made by 
the President of the Italian Council of Ministers at the Anti-Mafia summit, on November 17
th 2006, 
according to which Organised crime represents a significant deterrent for foreign firms interested in 
investing in southern Italian regions.   
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association” (art. 416 bis), defining the latter as follows: “the association is 
of the Mafia type when its components use intimidation, subjection and, 
consequentially, silence (omertà), to commit crimes in order to directly or 
indirectly acquire the management or the control of businesses, concessions, 
authorizations, public contracts and public services, to obtain either unjust 
profits or advantages for themselves or others...”. Despite this clear 
definition, the measurement of the actual extent of the criminal 
organizations, in particular the Mafia, is very difficult: crime networks are, 
in fact, in themselves a complex and elusive phenomenon (Lampe, 2004, 
Paoli, 2004).  
In this study, in order to estimate the incidence of criminal 
organizations we refer to official data relative to different crimes that are 
symptomatic of the presence of the Mafia. Even if is not always possible to 
disentangle crimes committed by the Mafia from others committed by 
ordinary criminals, some offences are not typical of organized crime: for 
example, theft, fraud and sexual violence are not, in general, committed by 
the Mafia. On the basis of studies of the subject (La Spina and Lo Forte, 
2006) we have therefore constructed an index of organized crime based only 
on certain crimes: extortion, bomb attacks, arson and criminal association. 
Extortion represents a crime typical of the Mafia organizations. As 
judiciary inquests testify, all Mafia families exercise their power over a 
territory through the racket of extortion. However, official data notably 
under-report the number of cases of extortion committed, particularly in the 
Southern regions. Whenever extortion is imposed by the mafiosi, only a 
small fraction of those victimized, in fact, denounce the crime. Estimates 
and inquiries suggest that the spread of the phenomenon is, in fact, much 
greater than that indicated by official data. According to some estimates, the 
‘racket of kick-backs’ would affect 70 per cent of Sicilian businessmen, 50 
per cent of those in Calabria, 40 per cent of those in Campania, and 30 per 
cent of those in Apulia, for a total of over 120,000 businessmen in these 
four regions (Confesercenti, 2007). Even if these estimates should be 
considered prudently, in some regions the cost of extortion could be notable. 
In the case of Sicily, extortion has been estimated as representing a cost 
equal to 1.3 per cent of the regional GDP (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008). 
Since the number of complaints significantly under-report the 
effective extent of the extortion racket, our analysis considers other crimes 
which are symptomatic indicators of the activities of organized crime. These 
are bomb attacks and arson, which are carried out to threaten and intimidate 
the economic operators or politicians and which, because of their 
characteristics, cannot be concealed by the victims, as often happens, 
however, in the case of extortion. In particular, bomb attacks and arson are  
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often used to force businessmen reluctant to pay extortion. Finally, we 
considered the crime of criminal association, as covered by the articles 416 
and 416-bis of the Italian Penal Code. This crime is measured by the 
number of people denounced to the Judicial Authorities.  
In summary, the incidence of organized crime is given by the sum of 
these four crimes (extortion, bomb attacks, arson, criminal association) per 
10,000 inhabitants. In the period 2001-2005 these crimes represented 
approximately one per cent of the cumulate total of crimes denounced in 
Italy. 
 















Data are referred to crimes denounced to Judicial Authorities. Cumulative data for the period 2000-
2005. Source: Calculations on Istat data. 
 
Fig.2 illustrates the crime rates. It can be seen how in the South the 
number of these crimes for every 10,000 inhabitants is far higher in respect 
to the rest of the country. Significant differences also clearly exist in the 
incidence of crime within the Mezzogiorno area. The crime figures are, in 
fact, extremely high in Calabria, Campania, Sicily and Apulia, or rather in 
those regions where the Mafia organizations, Cosa nostra,  ‘Ndrangheta, 
Camorra and the Sacra Corona Unita, are historically rooted (Paoli, 2004). 
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Figure  3.  Organized crime index, 2001-2005. Cumulative values per 10,000 









Source: Elaborated from ISTAT data, “Territorial information system on justice”. 
  
The “geography of crime”, resultant from the index of organized 
crime as previously calculated, is illustrated in Fig. 3. Besides making clear 
the existence of significant differences between the North and South, the 
criminal geography seems to reproduce fairly faithfully the “map” of the 
Mafia families that emerges from judicial enquiries, and from reports 
compiled by the Institutions that deal with criminal phenomena (CPI, 2008). 
On the basis of this index, in the following paragraph we shall examine the 
impact of crime on FDI, seeking to verify whether, as the entrepreneurs 
interviewed in the surveys and numerous economic analysts and politicians 
maintain, crime is an effective block to potential foreign investors.  
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4. The empirical analysis  
4.1. Data description 
To examine the effect of organized crime on FDI inflows, we use 
data for 103 Italian provinces for the period 2002-2006, estimating different 
specifications of the Eq. 1: 
1 i,t i,t-1 2 i,t-1 it FDI X Crime w α ββ =+ + +  [1] 
 
where i represents province, t time and 
i,t i i,t we u = +  is the error term. 
The dependent variable is the log of FDI inflow in the provinces, 
1 i,t Χ −  is a 
set of lagged control variables, while Crime is a measure of the incidence of 
crime. 
The data on FDI inflow into the Italian provinces is gathered by UIC 
(the Italian Exchange Office), in order to compile the balance of payments. 
In conformity with international definitions, the FDI establish a long-term 
interest between a company headquartered abroad and one headquartered in 
Italy
5. Because of the way in which they are collected, the data on FDI 
present some limitations, the most important of which is the fact that when 
investment flows transit via one or more intermediaries, the methods of 
reception (immediate beneficiary) do not permit control over the final 
geographical destination (Mariotti and Mutinelli, 2009). For this reason, the 
comparison between data on flows and those relative to the number of 
multi-national companies should be made with great care. Notwithstanding 
the limitations, the regional distribution of foreign firms that results from 
data on FDI, and data based on the number of plants, present many 
similarities; furthermore, empirical research on FDI determinants, 
conducted using the two data-sources, generally leads to similar 
conclusions. The FDI data have the advantage of provincial disaggregation 
and of a wide temporal coverage, permitting comparison to analogous data 
furnished by international institutions. Furthermore, these data are used both 
in empirical analyses on the determinants of FDI (Bronzini, 2004) and in 
descriptive research to quantify Italy’s attractiveness to investors.  
                                                 
 
5 According to the official definitions, a direct investment enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in 
which a foreign investor owns 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power for an 
incorporated enterprise, or an unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor has equivalent 
ownership (IMF, OECD, 2000).   
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The incidence of organized crime is measured by the index described 
in the previous section, calculated as the sum of extortions, bomb attacks, 
arson and criminal association per 10,000 inhabitants. Other kinds of crimes 
have been considered as control variables: the number of crimes against 
property (with the exception of that included in the “organized crime 
index”), and thefts and robberies, per 10,000 inhabitants. All data on crime 
is collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) in the 
Informative System on Italian Justice.  
On the basis of studies on FDI determinants, the control variables 
included in the regression are related both to the dimension and to the 
economic structure of the provinces. Market size, one of the main 
determinants of FDI, is proxied by the log of the resident population 
(Population) in each province, and by the share of provincial GDP of that of 
the region (Size). Considering the profound regional development 
imbalances that characterize Italy, the GDP per capita (in log) is included 
among the regressors. We also included a measure of the degree of openness 
of the provincial economy, given by the share of exports on GDP (Export), 
and a proxy of R&D activities, given by the number of patents presented to 
the European Patent Office (Patents). Furthermore, some variables related 
to the economic and productive structure have also been considered. These 
were the share of medium and large firms (with more than 50 employees) of 
the total number of firms (Big firms), and the number of firms in non-
agricultural sectors per 1,000 people (Firms). Since the location of 
companies also tends to be influenced by an area’s accessibility, we 
considered an index of total infrastructural endowment (Infrastructure). We 
then inserted, among the regressors, a proxy of the financial incentives to 
companies conceded under the Law no.488/92 (Incentives) which, in the 
period under examination, was the principal instrument of incentives for 
investment in Italy. This variable was considered in order to evaluate 
whether financial incentives and subsidies, conceded particularly to 
companies investing in Southern Italy, also influenced the location of 
foreign companies in areas where disincentives related to the social and 
institutional context exist. Table 1 in the appendix describes the data and 
their sources. 
4.2. Estimation results 
To choose the most appropriate estimator, we first tested for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, running a basic specification of Eq. 1 with 
GDP per capita, population and crime index as control variables. The 
standard assumption of homoskedasticity disturbances can, in fact, be too 
restrictive when, as in this case, the cross-sectional units present different  
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sizes and, consequently, different variations (Baltagi, 2008). Table 4 reports 
the results of the diagnostic for panel data — F statistic, Breusch-Pagan’s 
test and Hausman’s test — that suggest that the fixed effect model is not 
adequate for the nature of the data. Based on this, in our analysis we used a 
group-wise weighted least square (WLS) estimator for panel data, a specific 
case of Feasible GLS estimators. The FGLS estimator is consistent under 
the basic random effects assumptions, consequently it is generally used 
when dealing with simple forms of auto-correlation or group-wise 
heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002: 257-264) and appears appropriate to 
our data.  
 
Table 4. Diagnostic for the basic model 
Test Results 
White   LM = 40.48 - p-value = P (chi
2 (9) > 40.48) = 0.000 
Wald *  chi
2 103 8049.87 -p-value = 0 
Joint significance F    F (102.4) = 4.40 - p-value 0.000 
Breusch-Pagan**  LM = 160.7; p-value = prob. (chi
2 (1) > 160.7) = 0.000 
Hausman test***  H = 5.34 p-value = prob. (chi
2 (3) > 5.34) = 0.14 
FDI is regressed on GDP per capita, population and organized crime index. *Based on FGLS 
residuals; ** a low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS model is adequate, 
in favor of the fixed effect alternative; ***a low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the 
random effects model is consistent, in favor of the fixed effects model.  
 
 
Table 5 reports the results of estimations. The model has a high 
explicative power. The results confirm how the provincial distribution of 
FDI inflows is primarily influenced by the level of development and by the 
dimension of the local market, as measured by resident population. 
Nevertheless, the number of firms, the proxy of R&D activities (patents) 
and the share of large firms result among the determinants of FDI. In all 
specifications the organized crime index is significant, and negatively 
correlated with FDI. Furthermore, it is possible to observe  how financial 
incentives to investment do not seem to influence the distribution of FDI, 
probably because such incentives are granted in greater measure to those 
firms that invest in the less developed areas of the country, and therefore 
this variable also tends to reflect some regional characteristics. To analyze 
the effects of crime more in depth, we have considered other specifications 
that included the incidence of theft and robberies and the rate of crimes 
against property (Prop. crime) as control variables. Tab 6 reports the results 
of estimations. There is a negative but not significant correlation between 
these crimes and FDI, while the other explanatory variables maintain their 
significance and coefficient signs. This is not a surprising result: in fact, 
research shows that the incidence of crime (excluding Mafia type) is  
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generally higher in those areas with greater economic activity (Cracolici and 
Uberti, 2009). In our analysis this suggests that not all crimes, only some 
linked to the presence of a Mafia type organization, tend to discourage 
potential investors.  
   
Table 5. The effect of organized crime and FDI inflows 
  [1]  [2]  [3] [4] [5] [6] 
const  -72.37**  -62.00**  -61.71** -61.65** -62.75** -61.54** 
  (-35.74)  (-22.18)  (-19.67) (-19.57) (-19.26) (-17.88) 
Organized 
crime  -0.039**  -0.046**  -0.046** -0.047** -0.047** -0.042** 
  (-2.39)  (-2.71)  (-2.69) (-2.69) (-2.75) (-2.41) 
GDP  pc  5.831**  4.918**  4.901** 4.902** 5.029** 4.954** 
  (29.87)  (19.12)  (18.20) (18.17) (17.56) (15.38) 
Population 1.952**  1.757**  1.745** 1.741** 1.757** 1.706** 
  (33.97)  (24.55)  (18.94) (18.81) (18.86) (16.67) 
Big Firms    0.463*  0.4845*  0.457  0.359  0.552 
   (1.95)  (1.95) (1.32) (1.01) (1.52) 
Firms    0.0082**  0.0082** 0.0081** 0.0064** 0.0068** 
   (3.08)  (3.07) (3.00) (2.13) (2.26) 
Patents    0.0029**  0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0030** 0.0031** 
   (4.85)  (4.80) (4.76) (4.89) (4.85) 
Size      0.0006 0.0008 0.0003 0.0011 
      (0.21) (0.26) (0.11) (0.34) 
Export       0.052  0.053  -0.102 
       (0.11)  (0.11)  (-0.22) 
Infrastr.        -0.001  -0.001 
         (-1.29)  (-1.09) 
Incentives         0.0001 
           (0.103) 
n  515  515  515 515 515 492 
R
2  Adj.  0.86  0.87  0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 
lnL  -728.3  -724.6  -724.3 -724.3 -723.8 -690.5 
Method: Group-wise WLS. T-statistics in parentheses; * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level 
 
 
Table 6. Crimes and FDI inflows  
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
const -67.67**  -66.50**  -64.88** 
 (-24.37)  (-24.81)  (-22.66) 
GDP  pc  5.369** 5.189** 5.033**  
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 (19.77)  (19.29)  (17.68) 
Population  1.856** 1.891** 1.856** 
 (24.82)  (20.91)  (24.42) 
Big Firms  0.4386*   0.5667**  0.7801** 
  (1.72) (2.36) (2.86) 
Firms 0.0089**  0.0088**  0.0115** 
  (3.09) (3.04) (3.65) 
Patents 0.0026**  0.0024**  0.0023** 
  (4.50) (4.02) (3.73) 
Infrastr.  -0.0011  -0.0010    -0.0011   
  (-1.06) (-0.97) (-0.99) 
Theft -0.0007       
 (-1.57)     
Robberies     -0.0091  
   (-1.23)  
Prop. crime      -0.0002   
     (-0.70) 
n 515  515  442 
R
2  Adj.  0.87 0.87 0.87 
lnL -725.5  -726.8  -622.3 
Method: Group-wise WLS. T-statistics in parentheses; * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level 
5. Conclusive remarks 
Organized crime affects the legal economy in various ways: through 
extortion, direct or indirect control of business or, simply, increasing the 
risks and the costs of business.  This paper studies the effects of organized 
crime on foreign investment, focusing on the case of Italy. This case is 
interesting for diverse reasons. Firstly, in Italy there is a historical presence 
of organized crime of the Mafia type, rooted particularly in the Southern 
regions. Secondly, Italy is characterized by profound regional disparities, 
and the presence of the Mafia is unanimously considered one of the main 
constraints to economic development in the less developed areas. Finally, 
the South of Italy receives a very low share of FDI inflows.  
Our analysis shows how, coeteris paribus, a higher presence of 
crime, especially of the Mafia type, significantly reduces foreign investment 
inflows. Such a correlation is significant, even when the regressions include 
a proxy of the financial incentives granted to firms that invest in the less-
developed areas. This result suggests that the presence of crime, a strong 
disincentive related to the socioeconomic environment, tends to reduce the  
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effectiveness of development policies. Our analysis does not indicate the 
presence of crime as the main or the sole reason for the low attractiveness of 
the Southern regions. FDI inflows are, in fact, influenced by different 
economic and institutional determinants. The presence of the Mafia can be, 
however, considered a specific “comparative disadvantage” of the less 
developed regions.   
Our results are consistent with some surveys that contain the 
opinions of potential foreign investors about opportunities for investing in 
Southern Italy. Said surveys indicate, in fact, how the presence of organized 
crime is perceived by businessmen as a powerful block to investments in the 
Mezzogiorno. It is possible to observe how, in some areas, crime is only one 
aspect – certainly the most evident and dramatic – of a social and 
institutional context characterized by other forms of illegality that include 
corruption and, even more widespread, the violation of regulations 
necessary for the good functioning of the market (La Spina and Lo Forte, 
2006).  
Our analysis does not exclude that a high incidence of crime, other 
than discouraging investment, can also be perceived as a signal of a socio-
institutional system unfavorable for business activities. This “signal effect” 
can be particularly important to potential foreign investors, who are 
generally less informed in respect to national investors. The magnitude of 
the effect of crime on firms’ location decisions is, probably, amplified by 
investors’ perceptions about the business climate quality in regions with a 
comparatively higher incidence of crime.  
Although our analysis refers specifically to Italy, it is related to the 
international literature that indicates how institutional quality matters for 
firms’ location decisions, and consequently for economic performances 
(Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005). This paper is also related to the literature on 
the social costs of crime, in particular with those works that analyze the 
effects of crime on the legal economy and the enterprise sectors (Krkoska 
and Robeck, 2006, Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009).  
Policy implications are consequential. In the case of Italy, better 
security conditions (and the improvement of local socio-economic contexts) 
would increase regional attractiveness to FDI and, probably, the 




Table 1. Description of variables and sources 
Variables Description    Sources 
FDI  Average FDI inflow in the provinces in the period 
2004-06, in log. The data refers to the investment 
flows and does not include commercial credits and 
banking sector transactions. 
  
Italian Exchange Office 
(UIC) 
Population  Resident population in each Italian province, in log. 
Proxy of the size of the local market. 
 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
Census data. 
GDPpc  GDP per capita, in log. Proxy of the level of 
development. 
 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data. 
Size  Provincial GDP on the GDP of Italy. Proxy of the size 
of the local market.  
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data. 
Incentives  Variable of proxy of the financial incentives granted to 
firms, given to the investment projects granted under 
the Law 488/92. Data refers to the projects for creating 
new production plants in the industrial sector 
(excluding “special industry” calls for proposals) 
Ministry for Economic 
Development – Ipi-Print 
databank 
Firms  Number of firms in non-agricultural sectors, per 1,000 
inhabitants 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data. 
Export    Total export on GDP   Elaborated from ISTAT 
data. 
Patents  Number of European patents presented to the 
European Patent Office (EPO) 
European Patent Office - 
Unioncamere 
Bigfirm  Share of firms with more than 50 employees out of the 
total number of firms 
Elaborated from ISTAT 
data. 
Infrastructures  Synthetic index of infrastructure endowment 
(excluding ports) in percentage terms compared 
nationwide.  
G. Tagliacarne Institute 
Extortion  The number of crimes of extortion denounced per 
10,000 inhabitants. 
Elaborated from Istat 
data, “Territorial 
Informative System on 
Justice” (online 
databank). 
Association   The number of crimes of criminal association 




Attacks  Number of (bomb) attacks, per 10,000 inhabitants.  Idem   
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Arson  Number of cases of arson, per 10,000 inhabitants.  Idem  
Theft  Number of thefts, per 10,000 inhabitants  Idem  
Robberies  Number of robberies, per 10,000 inhabitants   
Organized 
crime  
Sum of extortion, attacks arson, association (as above 
defined) per 10,000 inhabitants.  
Idem 
Property crime  Total number of crime against property (with the 
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